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Abstract.
Since The field of international relations in Brazil has expanded rapidly in recent years, as many Brazilian students and scholars have become more interested in the outside world. This expansion of interest has coincided with a greater importance of global affairs in domestic politics following Brazil's transition to democracy. The increase in interest in international relations has not necessarily translated into the analysis of how foreign policy is made in Brazil; rather, much of the extant scholarship focuses on Brazil's place in the international system and the strategies it has used or might use to change its place. This article attempts to correct that imbalance. Rather than privilege the stra tegic dimensions of Brazilian policy, we focus on the determinants of Brazilian foreign policy, specifically by analyzing the visible and activist administrations of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003 to the present). We demonstrate that these administrations both built upon prior traditions in Brazilian foreign policy and produced innovative responses to Brazil's changing place in the international system. We argue that over the course of the last two decades the traditional dominance of the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE or Itamaraty)3 in foreign policy making has declined. This was due both to an increase in the number of actors who are influencing or attempting to influence foreign policy making (partly as a consequence of democratization) and to an increase in presidential diplomacy. This does not mean that Itamaraty has become impotent, but it does mean that Itamaraty has had to accommodate these new dynamics and has seen its relative influence wane.
To make this general argument, the article proceeds in five sections. We first discuss our overall theoretical approach, which is situated within a long tradition of foreign policy analysis (but which is not usually applied to the Brazilian case). The second section examines how Brazilian foreign policy making has changed in the last two decades, with a focus on two trends: the participation of a larger number of actors in the policy-making process and an emphasis on presidentially led diplomacy during the Cardoso and Lula administrations. The third section is explanatory, focusing on factors at the international and domestic levels, operating on the assumption that it is only by adopting a multi-causal framework that we can understand the changes. In the fourth section, we move from foreign policy inputs to outputs, briefly considering several cases to illustrate our general arguments. These cases reverse the analytical lens, posing policy making as an independent rather than a dependent variable, in order to investigate whether presidentialization and pluralization are beginning to affect the broad contours of Brazilian foreign policy. The final section draws together our main conclusions.
Explaining Foreign Policy Choice
How has Brazilian foreign policy making changed, and why has it changed? In asking these questions, we depart from much of the work on Brazilian foreign policy, which tends to focus on the strategic goals of Brazilian policy or Brazil's insertion in the global order (Campos de Mello, 2002; Hirst, 2005; Hurrell, 2005) . These dimensions are of course crucial, but our focus here is on how foreign policy is made in Brazil. The classic formulation provided by Waltz (1959) claims that the sources of foreign policy making can be located at the international level (systemic changes), national level (domestic interest groups or state organizations), or the individual level (particular leaders or policymakers). Our work departs from a perspective of multiple causality: we claim that all three levels of analysis can help us understand how Brazilian foreign policy making has changed, and that none of the levels really overrides the others. Our approach underscores the recent judgment of Valerie Hudson (2005: 5) that "parsimony for its own sake is not revered" in the field of foreign policy analysis. This is not to say that we are advocating complexity for its own sake, but we do argue that to understand how the making of policy has changed (and stayed the same) we need to consider multiple levels simultaneously. is on Brazil, but we share the concerns of scholars who try to systematize our under standing of foreign policy making (Kegley, 1987; Neack, 2003) . The center of attention here is on domestic politics and political leadership, recurrent subjects in the comparative foreign policy literature.4 In the sections that follow, we flesh out how Brazilian foreign policy making has been transformed because of changes at the national and individual levels of analysis, and how these changes were con ditioned by an international and regional context.
Presidentialization and Pluralization under Cardoso and Lula
Foreign policy making in the Cardoso-Lula era has been marked by two principal trends, the pluralization of actors and the advent of presidentially led diplomacy. The former trend is more secular and was already under way well prior to the Cardoso administration, whereas the latter trend is linked overwhelmingly to the two most recent presidents. Although they are not perfectly coterminous, it is clear that these two trends (1) constitute a major break with historical patterns of Brazilian foreign policy making, and (2) have accelerated considerably in the post-1995 period. Taken together, the two trends pose an analytical puzzle, since on the surface they are mutually contradictory. How can there be both pluralization and personalization at the same time? Part of the answer to this puzzle lies in the status quo ante, the historical autonomy of the Ministry of Foreign Relations. The two trends become maintained an impressive degree of bureaucratic autonomy and isolation. It benefits from the formal and informal boundaries separating it from other ministries and agencies, and possesses a distinct organizational culture. Third, until recently its policy responsibilities were monopolistic. Although there were minor variations across time, it is fair to say that in postwar Brazil Itamaraty had virtually complete control over the design and execution of foreign policy, including trade policy.
Although
this situation clearly began to change in recent years, much of the conventional image of Itamaraty remains intact. In 2001, as the Cardoso govern ment was coming to a close, Amaury de Souza surveyed 149 members of Brazil's "foreign policy community." These included officials from the executive branch (the presidency, the key ministries, the diplomatic corps, the armed forces, and the Central Bank), the National Congress (deputies and senators involved in foreign relations and defense policy), business leaders, representatives of trade unions and NGOs, journalists, and many key academic specialists in international relations. When queried about how much attention the MRE gives to various actors from political and civil society, the foreign policy community essentially endorsed the idea of an autonomous Itamaraty (Table 1 ).
Souza's open-ended interviews were even more revealing. One respondent complained that "Brazil has a very large bureaucracy and there is little or no democratic oversight ... There is no negotiated agenda with society." Another noted that: "When it comes time to negotiate, the business community is not invited to participate. But later, we are the ones who have to live with what has been negotiated." Another respondent went further: "Itamaraty does not know Brazil. We need to break down these walled-off niches in foreign policy making. The bureaucratic isolation of Itamaraty, which once allowed it to maintain its quality, is today an obstacle" (Souza, 2001: 87-90) . The implications of this valuable elite survey are twofold. First, independently of whether the model of ironclad MRE autonomy is overstated, Brazilian elites tend to subscribe to it. Second, any pluralization of the foreign policy-making process since the mid-1990s has to be understood in relative rather than absolute terms. Pluralization departs from a unique baseline: the quasi-monopolistic reputation of Itamaraty. when leaving the national territory, it is relatively easy to reconstruct official travels abroad simply by counting the temporary accessions to power by the vice president and others in the constitutional line of succession.7 Figure 1 shows the trend in presidential travel abroad over the past three decades. Ernesto Geisel, the most influential president of the 1964-85 military regime, left Brazil only ten times in his five years in office. The first two democratic presidents, Jose Sarney higher rate than any predecessor. At the time, this was lampooned in the media as an absurdly high incidence of foreign travel.8 However, in his first term Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva easily surpassed Cardoso, surrendering the presidency more than 60 times in only four years.
The personal engagement patterns of Cardoso and Lula differed in significant ways. Cardoso gave more attention to developed countries, especially the United States and Europe, where he was already well known as an intellectual. One of his main objectives in foreign policy was to move away from the terceiro-mundista orientation of previous presidents (Almeida, 2004a; Lins da Silva, 2002) , and this was reflected in the attention he gave to bilateral relations with the US and on going dialogue with international financial institutions.9 Lula, on the other hand, has emphasized South-South relations, and used the tool of presidential diplomacy to reach out to previously underemphasized regions such as Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. There is no one-to-one relationship between presidential diplomacy and foreign policy orientation (see Figure 2 ). The foreign policies of Castello Branco ("automatic alignment" with the US, 1964-7) and Geisel (terceiro-mundismo, 1974-9) were both conducted at relatively low levels of direct presidential engage ment, whereas the differing priorities of Cardoso and Lula were pursued with high levels of personal intervention.
According Tirelessly crisscrossing the equator in his gleaming new Airbus A-319 (nicknamed AeroLula by the press), Lula met five times each with presidents George W. Bush and Nestor Kirchner, and visited Switzerland and Venezuela four times each. Travel abroad by Lula and Cardoso actually underestimates their degree of con tact with foreign officials, since they also began to hold an unprecedented number of state visits and international summits on Brazilian territory. Part of this, of course, is simply a reflection of regional trends, e.g. integration initiatives such as Mercosul and South American and Ibero-American summitry, which have shifted the physical loci of diplomacy southward (Burges, 2006; Malamud, 2005 The shift away from ISI was critical. Earlier political leaders such as Getulio Vargas andjuscelino Kubitschek had been instrumental in seeing this policy implemented.13
In the ISI era, however, there was not a great functional need for presidentially led diplomacy; rather, the political need was for the crafting of new domestic political coalitions to make desenvolvimentismo possible at home. This is not to say that there was not an international dimension to the management of ISI politics -clearly there was, particularly regarding relationships with transnational corporations. But given the priority placed on domestic politics, Brazilian leaders relied on Itamaraty professionals to manage Brazil's international relationships. The changing global context altered the nature of policy delegation to Itamaraty. A major consequence of the debt crisis and of the changing global ideological climate in the 1980s was that developing countries needed to engage the outside world much more regularly. They were constantly being pushed to change development orientation from inward to outward. The implication was that Brazilian presidents now had to calculate their moves on a whole range of policies (e.g. industrial, trade, and macroeconomic) with an eye to international repercussions. President Fernando
Collor de Mello (1990-2) was the first to realize this, though his initiatives in this direction were cut short by scandal. Both Presidents Cardoso and Lula saw the need to engage the international community directly when it came to com municating Brazil's changing development strategy, and made repeated efforts to demonstrate Brazil's engagement with the rest of the world. As economic policy making became a more important element of foreign policy, presidential leadership came to the forefront.
One of the main policy arenas where this new presidential leadership played itself out was in regional integration. Brazil had traditionally focused on its own development strategy without much interest in the rest of Latin America. The end Political Science Review 30 (2) of the Cold War, however, focused the minds of Collor and Argentine president Carlos Menem when it came to the place of South America in the world. They built on the preliminary efforts of their predecessors and ended up with one of the most ambitious economic integration programs ever contemplated among developing countries: Mercosul. Professional diplomats in Itamaraty, trained to search for new strategic options for Brazil, undoubtedly had a role in this breakthrough. But one of the main reasons that Mercosul was elevated strategically was because presidents wanted it to be a centerpiece of their foreign policy agendas. Critically, presidents from Collor to Lula viewed regional integration as a valued goal even when progress was slow in coming.
The Treaty of Asuncion that established Mercosul in 1991 was quite detailed about the future integration process, but its signing was initially met by a lack of enthusiasm in Brazil (Tachinardi, 1995) . At the time, a move toward a common market in South America was far ahead of the views of business or civil society, and Mercosul was clearly a top-down initiative at the outset (Cason and Burrell, 2002) . Moreover, the treaty was clearly one of the first moves toward a much more presidentialist foreign policy, although direct presidential intervention was quickly routinized in Mercosul diplomacy (Malamud, 2005) . The changing international environment also fomented the pluralization of actors in foreign policy making. As global civil society became more active on a wide variety of issues, Brazil was increasingly engaged by outside nongovernmental organizations on these issues.14 Civil society organizations (CSOs) in Brazil also built linkages to CSOs in other countries, inevitably increasing the "noise" and multilateral pressure on policymakers. Similar patterns have emerged at the regional level. The new South American regional context of the 1990s was coterminous with accelerating democratization in all countries, including Brazil. Although integration was initiated from the top down, it quickly sparked demands for par ticipation by civil society. Policy elites were forced to take account of these new actors (Zylberstajn etal., 1996 the globalization of civil society, as it were -have had an impact on the environment in which foreign policy is made. Once asked for their opinion, civil society actors will want to maintain a place at the table when it comes to formulating foreign policy. Under conditions of political democracy, which by the 1990s had become extraordinarily robust in Brazil, such a trend is not easy to reverse.
Domestic Politics
Domestic politics also have a role in explaining the changes wrought by Cardoso and Lula in the making of Brazilian foreign policy. Here we discuss three domestic political variables that we see as causal factors: partisanship and ideology, personality and process factors, and bureaucratic politics.
Unusually for Brazilian presidents, both Cardoso and Lula were architects and builders of political parties, the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), respectively. These have been the two most influential parties of Brazil's modern experiment with democracy, having fought the last four presidential elections between them, and both have remarkably well-developed transnational linkages with like-minded parties in Latin America and Europe. The PT, founded in 1980, began life as an independent socialist party with strong ties to anti-imperialist movements around the world, and within a decade it had become Latin America's most celebrated leftist party. The PSDB, founded in 1988, styled itself after its western European namesakes, with strong preferences for parliamentarism and a market-friendly welfare state. The PT and PSDB collaborated sporadically in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, cooperation gave way to heated rivalry when the PSDB opted to join the Itamar Franco government in 1992-4, a period in which Cardoso first served as foreign minister, then as finance minister, and finally defeated Lula in the first of two presidential contests fought directly between them.
It is commonly observed that both the PSDB and the PT underwent striking ideo logical changes when they arrived in national power in 1994 and 2002 , respectively (Hunter, 2007 Power, 2002; Samuels, 2004) . What is less noted is how the parties managed to preserve the transnational linkages that they had constructed prior to their surprising rightward shifts, and how these linkages continued to serve them while in office. Although seen in Brazil as a "neoliberal" allied with the political right, Cardoso maintained strong ties with socialist and social democratic parties in Europe. In the 1990s the rise to prominence of Clinton and Blair, together with the writings of sociologist Anthony Giddens (the intellectual architect of New Labour), led to the creation of the short-lived "Third Way" movement in which Cardoso was the primary voice from the developing world. Presumably he has done so partly to compensate for diminishing progressive cred entials at home. Lula's macroeconomic policies derived partly from an inherited IMF agreement, partly from authentic ideological change within the PT, and partly from the political necessity of power sharing with center-right coalition partners. But foreign policy has been different; it has constituted the main policy domain in which Lula and the PT have had relatively free rein to pursue long-standing ideological goals. As Almeida puts it concisely, "it is in foreign relations and inter national politics that the Lula government most resembles the discourse of the PT" (Almeida, 2004b: 162) . Because Cardoso and Lula effectively exploited linkages constructed earlier in their careers, the presidentialization of foreign policy was externally legitimated during their years in office. The pluralization of actors in foreign policy was facili tated by the social bases of the PSDB and PT, respectively. In the 1990s the PSDB They used their influence to see that MDIC and Agriculture had a seat at the policy table in Brasilia and to ensure that representatives of the private sector were in cluded on many of Lula's key trips abroad. It is of course ironic that a PT-led cabinet had the best connections to the export ing elite of any recent Brazilian government -but we argue that it is precisely because a leftist president was elected that bureaucratic power was pluralized. The foreign policy troika of Minister Celso Amorim, MRE secretary general Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, and long-time presidential advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia coexisted in a government that also featured heavyweights like Meirelles, Furlan, and Rodrigues.
The latter group saw no reason to obstruct the progressive South-South agenda of the former group as long as it coincided with the outward-oriented business interests that they represented. The boom in exports under Lula, combined with the president's aggressive sponsorship of trade missions to Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, made it easier than ever before to unify the two factions. In sum, a unique constellation of factors under Lula led to the blending of a historically petista foreign policy strategy with a business-friendly trade policy. Holding it all together was Lula: presidentialization promoting pluralization.
Does
It Matter? Changes and Continuity in Brazilian Foreign Policy The trends outlined above are interesting for observers of Brazilian domestic politics. Do these changing inputs, however, have any impact on the outputs of Brazilian foreign policy? Or are they simply "causes in search of an effect"? We argue here that although our topic is a moving target and the evidence still incomplete -the changes we outline above do appear to have some concrete effects on Brazil's insertion into the global political economy. We briefly treat three cases to illustrate our claims of change (and continuity), with particular focus on the Lula government: global trade negotiations and Brazil's leadership among developing countries, Mercosul and Brazil's assertion of regional leadership, and the recent dust-up over Bolivia's nationalization of its natural gas reserves.
Global Trade Negotiations
As Hirst (2005) and Hurrell (2005) have pointed out, Brazil was a strong supporter of the creation of the World Trade Organization, especially because the WTO allowed for structurally weaker countries in the international political economy to challenge policies of more powerful countries in a relatively neutral, rule-based environment. This was consistent with long-standing Brazilian goals in multilateral trade negotiations, which were to open agricultural markets in the United States and Europe and reduce the number of unilateral trade restrictions imposed by the United States in particular (Rios, 2003) .17
The Brazilian position in global trade negotiations took a turn for the more aggressive when the Lula government came to power in January 2003, and we argue that this occurred because of both increased presidentialization in foreign policy making and the pluralization of actors in the policy-making process. Lula entered office promising a much more "solidarity"-based foreign policy, reflecting long standing PT positions on how Brazil should relate to the rest of the world, and how there should be more "participation" of civil society in government generally.
Meanwhile, with more actors in civil society affected by international trade, given
Brazil's increased openness, there are more interested parties when it comes to for eign trade. To this point, however, the effects of presidentialization can be more readily observed. By way of illustration, it was just one month after Lula took office that Brazil requested the establishment of a WTO dispute-settlement panel to investigate US cotton subsidies.18 Brazil subsequently won its case in the WTO, which gave it the right to increase duties on a wide array of US imports into Brazil. As it happened, Brazil declined to enact these duties (Ribeiro, 2005) . The probable reason is that Brazilian policymakers viewed such retaliation as a counterproductive measure that would unnecessarily increase bilateral tensions.
In the meantime, the US Congress Political Science Review 30 (2) attempted to redesign agricultural policies so as not to contravene WTO rules. This was a delaying tactic, meant to put off a final change in US policy until after some broader agreement had been reached in the wider WTO negotiations that would also oblige Europe to reduce its own farm subsidies.
Brazil also became more assertive on the world stage through its activities to push a "developing country" agenda in multilateral trade talks. This has been pursued via leadership of the G-20, which Brazil founded along with other developing countries in advance of the WTO ministerial meetings in September 2003 (Narlikar and Tussie, 2004) . This coalition within the WTO has attempted to advance what it sees as the common interests of the global South, particularly since the most com mon complaint among poorer countries regarding the GATT was that it excluded virtually all issues of importance to them. Lula, at a speech to G-20 Asia, (da Silva, 2003) It is safe to say that much of this is rhetoric that will never be realized, but the ambitions behind it are revealing. Lula has positioned himself as a global champion of the world's poor, and has been able to raise his profile significantly.19 And while it is the case that Lula has not been "assertive" along the lines of a Hugo Chavez, this stylistic difference does not mean he is less effective than someone like Chavez, who is frequently seen as a demagogue and viewed warily by many.
Lula, unlike Chavez, makes most of his government's positions known through existing international and regional institutions, and is not seen as someone who is trying to delegitimate the international system. This position-taking on trade and globalization is noteworthy: international relations is the only policy area where Lula has been able to maintain fidelity to the PT's historic worldview (Almeida, 2003 (Almeida, , 2004b (Almeida, , 2006a . The PT has clearly abandoned earlier policy demands (e.g. a moratorium on the repayment of Brazil's foreign debt, or a break with the IMF) that would have isolated it from centers of international financial capital, but Lula's stewardship of the G-20 shows that he has attempted to compensate for this in other ways. In this sense, the Lula gov ernment resembles PRI-dominated Mexico: while the PRI carried out relatively orthodox and pro-business policies on the domestic level, it made a special effort to show its progressive credentials in foreign policy. The PRI did this in a variety of ways, most particularly by maintaining normal relations with Cuba at a time when the United States was doing all it could to isolate the Castro regime (Hey and Kuzma, 1993) . The international context is different now, as the Cold War struggle has largely been replaced by debates over globalization. As his earlier participation in the World Social Forum shows, Lula has found it politically beneficial to side with those who have "lost out" because of globalization. As president, Lula has been encouraged to pursue this direction by MRE secretary general Guimaraes, among others (see Guimaraes, 2002) . Overall, in the case of Lula, there is a clear interaction between domestic-level politics -the PT's need for something progressive to hang on to -and a regional context where Brazil vies with a Chavez-led Venezuela for regional leadership. The outcome here is a more assertive foreign policy.
Mercosul and Regional Integration
Mercosul provides one of the first domains of intensely presidentialist diplomacy in the post-authoritarian period. Mercosul was summit-driven from the very beginning -even before it was known as Mercosul -as President Jose Sarney and his
Argentine colleague Raul Alfonsfn took the first measures to bring the traditional South American rivals together (Manzetti, 1990) . Presidentialism was even more important when the actual Treaty of Asuncion was signed in March 1991. Both Collor de Mello and Menem signed the agreement with an accelerated timetable, which was meant to force their economies to adjust in a very short period of time, and (crucially) to do so before either of their presidential terms had ended. The goal of the Treaty itself was to lock in place the free-market reforms that each president was pushing, and to make sure that their integration project had a legacy beyond their own presidencies.20 The Treaty itself laid out a schedule of tariff reductions, which were adhered to, with occasional backsliding. In addition, its early years coincided with the first major burst of region-wide growth after Latin America's "lost decade" of the 1980s. The Treaty quickly garnered political support in Brazil, since the pie, overall, was growing. The Mercosul project was also something that Itamaraty was interested in, but it is only because of presidential summitry that Mercosul had a chance to get off the ground. That said, the project itself entered into a slow-motion crisis beginning with the Brazilian devaluation of the real in early 1999, and it has yet to fully recover from this crisis. Figure 3 charts the arc of Mercosul's heyday and crisis, and makes clear both why there was such enthusiasm for the project in the mid-1990s and why there was such pessimism after both Brazil and Argentina experienced currency crises.
Most interesting for our analysis is that neither Cardoso nor Lula concluded that Mercosul should be jettisoned after these acute crises. Rather, their response was just the opposite, and presidential diplomacy proved crucial in multiple attempts to "relaunch" the Mercosul integration process (Gomez Mera, 2005; Malamud, 2005) . 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 figure 3. The rhetoric in this speech reflects an ideological preoccupation with the South, and South America in particular. Despite repeated setbacks, regional integration has remained high among Brazil's foreign policy priorities. While it is true that Itamaraty has viewed Mercosul -from a strategic point of view -as a way to assert Brazilian leadership in Latin America, events since the late 1990s provide little evidence of such an effect. Rather, Mercosul has remained on the foreign policy agenda because presidents have kept it there. And they have kept it there not only out of personal and political conviction, but also because the relative success of Mercosul itself has multiplied the number of actors with an interest in the integration process (Hirst, 1996; Portella de Castro, 1996 
Domestic Politics and Bolivian Gas
The recent Bolivian gas nationalization episode provides another case study demonstrating that change in foreign policy making "matters." A hallmark of presidential diplomacy under Lula has been the close ties he has forged with left leaning presidents in Latin America. These include less controversial relationships with Nestor Kirchner (Argentina) and Tabare Vazquez (Uruguay), as well as more con troversial friendships with Hugo Chavez (Venezuela) and Evo Morales (Bolivia). On May 1 2006 Morales went public with his decision to nationalize the natural gas industry in Bolivia. By presidential decree, all foreign-owned gas fields and refineries were placed under the control of the state firm YPFB. Foreign investors were given six months to negotiate new contracts with YPFB and their profits were to be capped at 18 percent (Sousa, 2006 progressively sidelined by presidential diplomacy. Sources inside MRE leaked their suspicion that the Bolivian gas crisis was connected to another companero, Hugo Chavez -the hypothesis being that Chavez had "egged on" Morales, hoping that he would later mediate the inevitable Bolivia-Brazil spat. Thus, the episode was framed against a perceived shift in the balance of power in Latin America, with an ambitious Venezuela gradually supplanting Brazil as the emerging leader of the region. Brazil, after many years on the diplomatic offensive, had been placed on the defensive by Bolivia -whose population and GDP represent less than 5% and 2% of Brazil's, respectively -which was now viewed in some circles as an ill-disguised agent of Caracas. The media reaction and political recriminations showed that, for Brazilian elites, the upstaging was clearly difficult to swallow. We draw attention to this episode not because of Morales' decision, which is exo genous to our model and must be explained in a Bolivian (not a Brazilian) context. Rather, we emphasize the gas nationalization because of the domestic Brazilian reaction to it. Infighting over foreign policy -something almost unheard of in Brazilian politics -came out into the open as a result of the Bolivian episode in 2006. The sensation was that personalization of foreign policy had allowed Brazil to be blindsided. The interesting question of whether Morales would have taken this same controversial decision vis-a-vis a different Brazilian president is less important than the subjective interpretation of the episode in Brazil, where presidentialization was quickly assigned the blame for the crisis, leading to a sig nificant amount of political fallout.21
Conclusions
This article has argued that two recent trends, presidentialization and pluralization, have led to significant changes in Brazilian foreign policy making. Most notably, these processes have combined to downgrade the historical centrality and autonomy of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry. Of the two trends, we view personal leadership as the more advanced at present, although we suspect that the pluralization trend may "catch up" with presidentialization in the future. The analysis here leads to a provocative question: is it the case that presidential ization has made Brazilian foreign policy less consistent and "strategic"? We argue that the answer is a qualified yes. Personal relationships between Brazilian presi dents and their foreign counterparts have become far more important than in the past. The Sarney-Alfonsin dialogue was crucial in laying the groundwork for regional integration, and the Collor-Menem partnership was fundamental in making Mercosul a reality. The fact that Lula recognized the right of Bolivia to nationalize its natural resources immediately after Morales had acted contrary to Brazil's economic interests clearly speaks to a personal sympathy and ideological kinship. And, interestingly enough, the strong working relationship that Lula established with George W. Bush led many in the PT government to quietly sup port Bush's re-election in 2004, something that would have been unthinkable for the PT a few years before.
In the end, presidentialization has had several palpable effects on Brazilian foreign policy. First of all, it has made foreign policy more subject to the whims of presidents, whereas in the past foreign policy could be conducted consistently and behind closed doors by Itamaraty. Second, presidentialization has meant that foreign policy is much more "in a hurry." Presidents want to make a splash when it comes to their foreign policy goals, but they are also interested in efficiency and deadlines. old-style, intellectualized "diplomatic corps" less relevant to changing conditions. Second, exporters of all types are growing in domestic political influence in Brazil. In this decade, most of the overall new GDP growth has been generated by this group. They are the geese that are laying the golden eggs for Brazil, and they are likely to insist that Itamaraty take into account their views when it comes to making foreign trade policy. In the end, we argue that both presidentialization and pluralization will be trends that will strengthen in coming years. 
